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Effects on CIA Resulting From Publicity Caused By News
Release on Soviet Union's Economy

1. A review of the publicity caused by the news release on the Soviet Union's economy, particularly following the conference held on 9 January 1964 for public information representatives, has been made to determine the effects on the Agency. In addition to a review of the newspaper and magazine articles which appeared, other barometric indications were investigated to determine the ensuing effects on the Agency pertaining to the public information media, protection of sources and methods, morale of employees, public reaction, Congress, and relationship with other government agencies.


2. The following is a report on the effects by categories:

a. Public Information Media

At the conference held on 9 January 1964, there were 18 representatives from 16 public information media in attendance. It is noted that in some instances the public information media represented were unfavorable towards the Agency in their comments. The news release and its attribution to the CIA permitted Agency enemies, such as Richard Starnes, Henry J. Taylor and the Nation, to jump at an opportunity to continue their blistering attacks. In some cases, the old cry for the establishment of a joint congressional committee to oversee the Agency was heard. References to CIA propaganda were made, and additional weight to President Truman's recent remarks concerning the Agency was given. The Vancouver Sun of Canada criticized the Agency for not having invited the foreign press.

On 16 January 1964, both the New York Times (Tab A) and the Christian Science Monitor (Tab B) were quite unfavorable toward the Agency in their editorials. The Washington Star editorial of 14 January (Tab C) was also unfavorable. Besides pointing out that the State Department was

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miffed, the Washington Star stated that even the favored reporters were less than ecstatic. In addition to the long drive to McLean, they had two complaints. Either they were members of the small group to whom the CIA had already leaked the information -- in which case they resented its going to the press in public -- or else they were outsiders and were getting stuff late. The Washington Star concluded with "the best image for an intelligence agency remains no image at all." On 15 January 1964, a telephonic inquiry was received from MacLean's Magazine of Toronto, Canada, concerning the arrest and trial of two Canadians in Cuba last fall. One of the two reportedly claimed to be in the employ of CIA. The feature writer for MacLean's Magazine took a chance on receiving information from the Agency due in part to an apparent new press policy.

b. Protection of Sources and Methods

While in many instances, the reporting was on a straight feature article basis, attempts were made to indicate and/or to presume the CIA sources and methods in arriving at the status of the Soviet Union's economy. Even though sources and methods may not have been disclosed to the public information media representatives, such representatives in their own reporting styles are able to imply Agency disclosure of sources and methods. In particular, implied revelation of



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In addition, Agency attribution has apparently lead to requests for the details of CIA's calculations. Such reaction was particularly noted in the column written by Harry Schwartz in the New York Times of 9 January 1964 (Tab E). Economists and scholars indicated that the Agency's estimates could not be authoritatively evaluated unless the basic data and procedures were made public.

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c. Morale of Employees

Limited feed-back has been received from certain employees indicating that the prestige of working for CIA has been damaged by the policy of public disclosure. In certain cases, the privacy enjoyed in public contact by Agency employees was no longer evident. Where the public already respected the employees silence, public disclosure was taken as an indication that questions dealing with CIA employment could now be asked freely by the public.

d. Public Reaction

In addition to the public reactions cited above, it was noted that certain citizens took this opportunity to voice their anti-CIA views through letters to the editors. Tabs F and G furnish examples of such public attacks. No significant trend in public reaction, however, was noted in the receipt of mail, telephone calls, or visitors to the Agency.

e. Congress

In addition to the cries for a Congressional Watch Dog Committee, the criticisms of Senator Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio) and the requests of Senators Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.) and Claiborne Pell (D-RI) for the establishment of a select congressional committee patterned after the Joint Congressional Atomic Committee to watch the CIA were reported. An example of such report was by the Associated Press on 9 January 1964 (Tab H). On 10 January 1964, the Tampa Times (Tab I) reported that Representative Sam Gibbons of Florida was stepping up his efforts to establish a 14 member congressional "Watchdog Committee" over CIA. As can be seen, the publicity gave impetus to Agency criticism and to the demand for closer surveillance of CIA.

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f. Relations With Other Government Agencies

The public information media played quite heavily at discord between the State Department and the Agency resulting from the Soviet Union's economy press release. Such articles, for example, were carried in the Washington Star of 9 and 10 January 1964 (Tabs J and K). They indicated that the State Department and other Federal agencies objected to the CIA's role in the dissemination and the shaping of news dealing with foreign policy. It was reported that some State Department officials fear that the CIA is infringing on their role as the shaper of American policy. Max Frankel in the New York Times of 10 January 1964 (Tab L) reported that the State Department was chagrined at CIA's distribution of intelligence estimates. The Washington Post of 10 January (Tab M) and the Herald Tribune of 13 January 1964 (Tab N) also played up the angle of the State Department being disturbed. A Herb Block cartoon of 17 January 1964 (Tab O) also implied State Department/CIA rivalry. A limited amount of feed-back resulting from this publicity was reported by liaison representatives with other government agencies.

3. The facts enumerated above by specific categories reveal the many adverse effects upon the Agency. In some instances, some favorable reporting was noted. David Lawrence was one of the few to report favorably upon the Agency's news release. The Washington Star was favorable towards the security procedures and precautions taken in processing and escorting the public information media representatives. By and large, however, the effects and reactions must be termed unfavorable and negative towards the Agency.

4. If open news releases were to become CIA policy, the prerogatives of the public information media demands that all media representatives be invited. No select group is permissible, and the doors must be fully opened. Even foreign news representatives would almost have to be included.

5. World-wide intelligence and security organizations, however, are not known to hold news conference and to give out news releases, much less to permit attribution to any such activity. In the past, the Agency has faithfully followed this tradition and has abided by [] "Release of

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Agency Information To Public Information Media Or Representatives Thereof, " based upon paragraph 6c. of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (revised 18 January 1961) concerning policies and procedures to control and limit undesirable publicity relating to intelligence activities. It would appear wise, after a review of the effects resulting from the Soviet Union's economy news release, to return to a steadfast and stringent policy of no open news releases or conferences for the public information media or their representatives, thereby precluding publicity in any form pertaining to Agency estimates, programs, sources, methods, and functions. On the other hand, where certain news releases or special information programs are considered advisable from a policy standpoint or world-wide political effect, then such releases and programs should be well prepared and coordinated on an individual case basis with a sound security approach assuring an accurate positive advantage to the Agency. Such should be done with Agency attribution fully safeguarded.

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TAB

NEW YORK TIMES

JAN 16 1964

The New York Times.

Published every day in the year by The New York Times Company

ADOLPH S. OCHS, Publisher 1896-1908

ORVILLE E. DRYFOOS, Publisher 1901-1963



That C.I.A. Press Conference

The Central Intelligence Agency committed a blunder last week when it fell victim to the passion for publicity which afflicts too many persons and organizations in our society. The C.I.A.'s press conference disseminating its views on the Soviet economy has had enough boomerang effect to suggest that this first experimental C.I.A. venture in formal public relations may also be its last. We hope so.

At least three considerations were ignored by the C.I.A. when it decided to hold that unfortunate press conference. One is the old and sound rule that that intelligence organization is best which operates most secretly. A second factor was the implicit public intrusion this action represented into the prerogatives and duties of the State Department in the field of foreign policy. Long-standing suspicions that the C.I.A. has sometimes tended to overstep its functions into the policy-formation field can only be strengthened by this incident.

Furthermore, the propaganda purposes behind the C.I.A.'s revelation of its estimates of recent Soviet growth rates are clear. Propaganda has an important place in the modern world, but not in the judgments of an agency whose evaluations are the bases for major decisions affecting the national security.

The C.I.A. has only compounded its difficulties by its unwise abandonment of intelligence tradition; and it has reinforced the long expressed view of this newspaper that a Congressional "watchdog" committee for the Central Intelligence Agency would be a very good thing for the C.I.A. as well as for the country.

TAB

JAN 16 1964

Public Eye and Private Judgment

The CIA's first open news conference is said to have been authorized by President Johnson. We doubt the President thought the matter through.

His impulse was a good one. The public ought to understand what has happened to the Soviet growth rate on which newly compiled information is at hand. The new low rate is controversial but decisions are being made because of it. Public debate can help clarify whether the rate has been marked down too far because of the Soviet farm failures.

In general, the more information the public can be given the better it is.

But there was a hook in this press conference bait. The State Department and the White House are currently trying to persuade the NATO allies that they can help feed Soviet or Chinese citizens with food, for humanitarian reasons, but should not help the hard-pressed Communist economies. The new low growth estimate encourages the United States' argument that economic pressure on the Soviet Union, however painful to the West in terms of renouncing trade opportunities, will effectively help keep communism under restraint.

Leave the dispute itself to one side. The point we wish to make here is that the CIA press conference was aimed consciously at influencing American and world opinion, not on a matter of fact but

of judgment and policymaking. This ought not to be a CIA function. However good its staffs of economists and political analysts—we have no easy way to judge—the last function an intelligence gathering organization should undertake is to shape public opinion and make policy. Such objectivity as it has would rapidly corrode.

Allen Dulles used to make the CIA reasonably available to responsible inquiries from press and public at many levels. He used to make occasional speeches based on intelligence information. But except for the carefully chosen speeches, material from this quarter was to be used without attribution. It melted into the large stream of information from many sources. This system worked quite well considering there is no ideal way to conduct clandestine functions within an open society, and that it is hard to separate different kinds of intelligence.

We recommend a return to the Allen Dulles formula. There are empires enough in Washington policymaking. Many sources are pouring out purported information, too often for their own purposes. Let's not turn the overseas intelligence agency into another, however great the desire to inform or persuade. The White House, the State and Defense Departments, can release material important to explain decisions of foreign policy, where it is in the public interest.

TAB

WASHINGTON STAR

JAN 14 1964

The Evening Star

With Sunday Morning Edition

Published by THE EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER CO., Washington, D. C.

SAMUEL H. KAUFFMANN, *Chairman of the Board*

CROSBY N. BOYD, *President*

NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

BENJAMIN M. McKELWAY, *Editorial Chairman*

The Image at CIA

Whatever their ideological differences, James Bond and Dr. No have always shared one basic trait of their shadowy calling. When the press came around with questions, they had no answers. They hadn't been there, they didn't know what was being talked about and they had no comment.

Until recently our own CIA also went in for the professional taciturnity of the spy. Then suddenly last week the agency invited a score of reporters out to its Langley lair and went all garrulous on the state of the Soviet economy, which is held to be pretty shaky. The position of the CIA in its new departure, however, is even shakier.

For one thing the State Department is reported to be miffed at the speaking spooks, since this kind of comment has always been the province of State. Predictably, even the favored reporters are less than ecstatic. Not counting the long drive out to Virginia, they have two complaints. Either they were members of the small group to whom the CIA had already leaked the information—in which case they represented its going to the press in public—or else they were outsiders, and were getting the stuff late.

Worse still is the presumed motivation for the publicity. The Langley seminar directors aren't even trying to manage the news. All they want its to create a better institutional image by showing off some of the intelligence in Intelligence.

Well, it's nice to know there is some, but this only demonstrates again the fundamental difficulty of Americans in undercover work. They cannot stay under cover.

The best image for an intelligence agency remains no image at all.

TAB

NEW YORK TIMES - 8 Jan. 1964

SHARP SLOWDOWN IN SOVIET GROWTH REPORTED BY C.I.A.

Agency Puts Economic Rise
at 2.5 Per Cent Yearly,
Below the U.S. Level

GOLD RESERVE FALLING

Farming Setback and Shift
In Investment Believed
Responsible for Lag

By EDWIN L. DALE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7—An exhaustive analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that the Soviet Union's economic growth in the last two years has been less than 2.5 per cent annually, well under the rate of the United States.

In addition, the C.I.A. has concluded that Soviet gold reserves have fallen to less than \$2 billion, far below estimates made elsewhere. These conclusions have been made public by the agency.

The C.I.A. put the value of the Soviet gross national product, or total output of goods and services, last year at about \$260 billion, slightly less than half that of the United States. The United States is widening the gap each year at recent growth rates, according to the report, and this widening is expected to continue.

The Central Intelligence Agency has virtually exclusive responsibility in the United States Government for evaluating the Soviet economy. Several hundred economists and other analysts work full time on the question. They primarily use published sources, which are now numerous, but the information is supplemented by some data obtained clandestinely.

Growth Slowed Abruptly

Like many other analysts, the C.I.A. experts concluded that Soviet economic growth in the postwar period was rapid until the last few years. While the rate varied from year to year, it was usually between 6 and 10 per cent, well above the United States average of 2.5 to 3.5 per cent.

In the last three years, partly as a result of a surge in 1961 following a recession, the United States growth rate has averaged about 5 per cent. The official estimate for the next year is also 5 per cent.

For the future, the C.I.A. analysts expect that the Soviet Union will be able to improve upon the poor performance of 1962 and 1963.

However, they do not believe that the Russians will be able to return to the growth rates of the earlier postwar period. A growth in the range of 4 to 5 per cent, about the same as that of the United States, is con-

sidered a reasonable prospect.

Since these are percentages and the United States has a much higher base, such a result would mean that the gap between the two economies would continue to widen in absolute terms.

In addition to the slowdown in the Soviet growth rate, the C.I.A. has also detected a major reduction in the rate of growth in investment — the base for future growth. In 1962 and 1963 each, total investment rose only 4 to 5 per cent, far less than in the earlier postwar period.

The C.I.A. analysts develop a figure for the Soviet gross national product by valuing in dollar terms the output of all the sectors of the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union does not use the concept of gross national product in its statistics.

Soviet Conclusions Differ

Soviet figures on industrial production alone would indicate much less of a slowdown in over-all growth than the C.I.A.'s conclusions. However, the C.I.A. is confident that its analysis is correct, based on various techniques of evaluating Soviet official statistics and other information.

There is no doubt in the mind of the analysts that the Soviet rate of growth has slowed greatly in the last two years, although they do not say that their figures are correct to the last dollar.

The analysts stress that their picture is not one of an economy in "collapse" or suffering from such ills as unemployment. But neither is the Soviet economy any longer a world pacemaker in expansion and growth. Every major non-Communist industrial nation has exceeded the Soviet growth rate in the last two years.

Three major reasons are given for the slowdown in economic growth.

The first is a shift in the so-called "mix" of the Soviet economy, that is, investment away from the heavy industries, raw materials and power supply toward the more sophisticated elements of modern industry.

"It was easier to build more and more steel mills and cement plants and hydroelectric dams than it is to build chemical plants and diversified consumer goods," one analyst said.

Arms and Space Costs Cited

The second reason has been a very large increase in military and space spending since about 1957 or 1958. While this counts as a part of the gross national product, it is "anti-growth" in that it takes resources and personnel from productive investment.

This has been particularly true since the shift of the military effort toward modern weapons such as missiles.

The third reason is the serious decline in agricultural output in the last two years. The C.I.A. now calculates that the total Soviet food production this year will be only about 3 per cent above 1956 and, on a per capita basis, will actually be 7 or 8 per cent less than in 1956. Wheat output last year is put at a minimum of 10 million tons below 1962.

Part of the problem results from bad weather. In the peak Soviet agricultural year, 1961, food output was 20 per cent above 1956.

The analysts are careful not to attribute the serious worsening of the Soviet position to the nature of the state-controlled Soviet economic system as such, though they say this could be a factor.

The C.I.A. analysts foresee no decline in the Soviet resources devoted to modern weapons, though there might be small cutbacks in conventional forces. Nor is there expected to be any easing of the investment problem posed by the basic industries.

Thus the overstrain on the economy, in the sense of a short-

NEW YORK TIMES (CON'T) - 8 Jan 1964

age of human and material resources for investment, is expected to continue, even with some improvement in farm output. The best course for Moscow, it is believed, would be to find extra resources, in the form of plants and equipment, in the West.

However, given the low level of Soviet gold reserves, this could be done only if the Western nations were willing to sell on credit, preferably, from the Soviet viewpoint, credit of more than five-year terms.

This reasoning is a factor behind the strong United States drive in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to get agreement on a limitation of credit terms extended by West European countries to the Soviet Union.

Soviet gold production is put at about \$150 million annually. Moscow's sales of gold in the West have been running at more than \$200 million a year, and last year were a little more than \$400 million.

Thus, gold sales cannot finance a big extra volume of Soviet imports of capital equipment from the West. Credit terms would be essential, the C.I.A. believes.

The Russians have approached suppliers in Britain with specific proposals for purchases on terms running well beyond five years. They are not believed to have been successful, but the British Government refuses to make a binding decision barring such terms.

Gain Asserted by Soviet**By HARRY SCHWARTZ**

The chief Soviet economic planner, Pyotr F. Lomako, asserted last month that his country was continuing to gain on the United States in industrial production.

Mr. Lomako asserted that

Soviet industrial production in 1963 was 65 per cent of that of the United States a gain of 2 percentage points over the 63 per cent ratio that the Soviet Union reported for 1962.

While the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the annual Soviet economic growth during the last two years was less than 2.5 per cent, the Soviet Union asserts that in 1962 alone its national income—a concept similar to gross national product—rose 6 per cent.

Last month Premier Khrushchev denounced speculation in the West that the Soviet Union would need credits to realize its ambitious chemical expansion program. He asserted that the Soviet Union would be able, if necessary, to achieve the chemical production goals from its own resources.

While acknowledging that Soviet grain production had fallen last year, Mr. Khrushchev spoke glowingly of what he asserted were continued high rates of industrial growth. He said that Soviet cotton production last year was the highest in the country's history.

The Premier gave for the first absolute figures on the growth of production of key commodities last year; these data are compared as follows with the corresponding output figures for 1961 and 1962: (All data are in millions of metric tons except for electricity, which is given in billions of kilowatt-hours, and shoes, stated in millions of pairs).

	1961	1962	1963
Steel	70.8	76.3	80.0
Oil	166	186	205.5
Electricity	328	369	411.6
Cement	50.9	57.3	60.3
Shoes	443	456	461
Fertilizers	15.3	17.3	20

Many Western observers have noted that in the last two years the Soviet economy was showing signs of slowing some-

what from the rapid growth rate of the nineteen fifties. But the estimate of the slowdown made public by the C.I.A. yesterday appears to be far more radical than any other yet published in the West by a responsible source.

Specialists on the Soviet economy have been aware for many years that comparisons of Soviet and American economic growth are full of pitfalls, and that even analysts who accept the same basic data may come to rather different conclusions.

One difficulty arises from the question of what to measure. The Soviet analysts include in their estimates of Soviet production only the output of material goods—steel, grain, shoes, etc.—and leave out the production of services—haircuts, medical services, the work of teachers, etc.

American analysts include both material production and services in their analyses. The two different definitions tend to produce differences in final evaluations.

A second difficulty arises from the lack of an unambiguous way of adding up production of different goods and services. Should output be valued at Soviet prices or American prices? Experiments have been made in the United States in which the same group of production targets have been valued in both Soviet and American prices. Significantly different results could be obtained, depending upon which price system was employed.

TAB

U.S. WILL CITE LAG IN SOVIET GROWTH TO DETER CREDITS

Will Tell Allies Export Aid
Would Help Moscow in
Economic Difficulties

By EDWIN L. DALE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8.—The Johnson Administration will use new evidence of a sharp slowdown in Soviet economic growth as an argument to persuade West European countries not to extend large export credits to the Soviet Union.

The evidence has been supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency. The agency made available yesterday its conclusion that Soviet growth has dropped from annual rates of 6 to 10 per cent in the last decade to less than 2.5 per cent in 1962 and 1963.

One reason behind the decision of the agency to make its conclusions available for public knowledge, it is believed, was that it might be taken as reinforcing the United States case in the debate with allied countries over credit sales to the Soviet Union. Another reason was to tarnish an "image" of the Soviet Union, in underdeveloped countries particularly, as a nation that had found the secret of rapid economic growth.

Some Experts Disagree

The C.I.A. conclusions are at variance with those of most non-government specialists on the Soviet economy. It is not clear whether the agency will make its analytical techniques known to others in the field.

[The C.I.A.'s conclusions were generally challenged by university experts on the Soviet economy. Some of them estimated that there had been a decline in the growth rate but considered the extent reported by the C.I.A. "fantastic."]

The move to make its findings public was a new departure for the intelligence agency. It is possible that in the future it will be somewhat less secretive about those aspects of its work that do not involve clandestine operations. One motive for this, if a policy change should be decided upon, is the relatively "bad press" the agency has received in recent years, centering mainly on operations in Cuba and South Vietnam.

However, regardless of future C.I.A. information policy, there was a clear United States Government policy interest in making public the agency's conclusions on the relatively poor Soviet economic performance, which sharply alter previous assessments.

In the case of credit sales to the Soviet Union of industrial plants and equipment by West European countries and Japan, the United States will stress that such sales are now more than ever virtually the only escape for the Soviet authorities from their economic difficulties.

Officials believe that Premier Khrushchev cannot significantly cut back the production of modern military equipment to find more resources for investment. Nor can he resort to the Stalinist policy of squeezing the consumer, still less the farmer.

Finally, the C.I.A. estimates of Soviet gold reserves and production rule out any large increase in Soviet imports of capital goods from the West financed by sales of gold.

The agency has concluded that Soviet gold reserves are now slightly under \$2 billion and that the country's annual production of gold is only \$150 million a year. Normal Soviet deficits in international transactions with the non-Communist world have required gold sales of at least \$200 million a year, without allowing for any big increase in capital goods imports.

Thus it is contended, first, that only imports can solve the Soviet problem and, second, that the Russians cannot pay cash for the imports. Western credit sales, by this analysis, would offer Mr. Khrushchev an escape from his problem, particularly if credit terms were extended beyond the five years normally offered for capital goods.

Whether this United States stand will impress the allies remains to be seen. All the major allies but Britain have already expressed their willingness to limit credit terms to five years but not to limit the amount of credit extended.

France signified yesterday her intention to press actively for more exports to the Soviet Union. In Britain, it is understood, Soviet purchasing agencies have already indicated that they would place large orders if credit terms could be extended beyond five years.

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

Some specialists on the Soviet economy expressed surprise and, in some cases, skepticism yesterday at a Central Intelligence Agency estimate of the extent of a decline in Soviet economic growth in the last two years.

The specialists, professors at United States universities, agreed that Soviet economic growth had slowed in recent years, particularly in 1963, because of a serious drop in grain production. What many of them found difficult to understand was the C.I.A.'s conclusion that the growth of the Soviet gross national product in the last two years was less than 2.5 per cent annually.

The strongest reaction to the C.I.A. estimate was expressed by Prof. Nicholas Spulber of the City University of New York. "I just cannot believe it," he said. "It is impossible." The professor added that he would be ready to accept a figure as low as 4 per cent annually but was baffled by the agency's estimate of less than 2.5 per cent.

In a similar vein, Prof. Warren Eason of Syracuse University termed the estimate "awfully low."

"I would want to look at it long and hard," he said.

Estimate Not Ruled Out

Prof. Robert Campbell of Indiana University called the difference between the intelligence agency's estimate and earlier figures on Soviet economic growth "fantastic." However, he added that the decline was bigger than one would conclude by looking at the individual components of Soviet production.

Prof. Herbert Levine of Harvard University said he had been "very surprised" by the 2.5 per cent figure but he added: "I am not too skeptical. The C.I.A. has been doing good work in this field."

Prof. Abram Bergson, also of Harvard, said, "I am a little surprised, but I can't rule it out."

The basis for the general reaction of astonishment was that estimates of Soviet economic growth for earlier years, prepared by the C.I.A. and others, had suggested that an annual rate of 6 or 7 per cent was correct.

Many specialists found it hard to understand how the Soviet economy could plunge in a few years from a 6 to 7 per cent growth rate to one of less than 2.5 per cent.

Several indicated that they had believed the Soviet decline to be less precipitous than the estimate reached by the intelligence agency's analysts.

There was general agreement among the specialists that, regardless of whether the 2.5 figure for 1962 and 1963 was correct, it would be dangerous to suppose that the Soviet economy would grow at any such low rate in the future.

Professor Levine said that if the Soviet Union had good weather this year and the harvest improved, the country's rate of economic growth could rise to as much as 9 per cent.

On this point, Professor Bergson said that there was evidence that Soviet economic "prospects are not nearly so good as was widely assumed a few years ago, but it would be unwise to project from the last two years."

All the economists expressed curiosity about the details of the Central Intelligence Agency's calculations. Several noted that the agency's estimates could not be authoritatively evaluated by independent scholars unless the basic data and procedures were made public.

There were indications that the C.I.A. had made available some of its basic material on nonmilitary industrial production in the Soviet Union.

Several of the economists agreed that the key variable in judging the estimate of the Central Intelligence Agency was the level of agricultural output assumed in making the calculations.

N. Y. Times

1-9-64

TAB

A Communication

"Let us now praise famous men"—
Men of little showing—
For their work continueth,
And their work continueth,
Broad and deep continueth,
Greater than their knowing."

I quote, of course, from Ecclesiastes, with an assist from Rudyard Kipling. I refer, of course, to that selfless band, the CIA. In the nick of time, if I may be permitted a worn phrase, they have come to our rescue. At the last moment they have made for us a sovereign remedy against the fearful creeping malady of peace. I, for one, have never doubted they would meet the emergency.

There are some, to be sure, who do not share my commitment. Unkind things have been spoken of the CIA. A group of pinchbeck intellectuals, it has been implied, is what they are. And worse. Failed academics; parvenu diplomats; do-it-yourself revolutionaries; arriviste subverters; half-baked philosophers; global troublemakers; incompetent military planners; infernal busybodies; hirers of the largest collection ever assembled of foreign dingalings, psychotic patriots, and second murderers. I protest.

Swift said of an 18th Century politician that it was his misfortune to be perpetually mistaken. Let the CIA record speak. The U-2 affair, the overthrow of the governments of Guatemala and Iran, the Bay of Pigs, the Viet-Nam solution, the break with Cambodia. From strength to strength, a highway of triumphs.

And now the crown, a timely, impeccable analysis of the economic miseries of the Soviet Union. There have been serious crop failures: in particular, a disastrous drop in grain production. As a result, the CIA estimates, the growth of the Soviet gross national

product in the last two years was less than 2.5 per cent. The economic machine is slowing down, grinding to a stop. If we are patient it may yet go backwards. What folly then for Western countries to extend to the Soviet Union large export credits! I learn from the New York Times that the Johnson Administration will use this argument as a linchpin of its wheel of foreign policy. It may not be obvious how this jibes with the President's fervently expressed desire in his State-of-the-Union Message to dissolve the hatreds of the world, to be "bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all while violating the interests of none." But high policy is always mysterious and there are stranger ways of gaining a people's confidence than by kicking them in the belly when it is empty. The important thing is to make clear to them it is for their own good.

Amor vincit omnia.

It has come to my notice that the CIA statistics are not everywhere fully accepted. Among university experts on the Soviet economy, it is reported, the CIA's conclusions have been "generally challenged." Such epithets as "absurd," "impossible," "fantastic," have been used. The academic critics have been unable to contain their astonishment, the Times relates, at the CIA's reversal of their own position, for as recently as last year they suggested a 6 to 7 per cent annual growth of the Soviet economy. Fiddlesticks. Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be: why then should we desire to be deceived? The CIA men stick to the facts; their appraisals are supple and responsive. They may change tomorrow—and a good thing too.

Moreover, what difference can a few per cent make? The noted Princeton economist, Oskar Morgenstern (who with the late John von Neumann wrote the classic work on game theory) points out in his well-known book, "On the Accuracy of Economic Observations," that large-scale statistics are almost always "unreliable and misleading." History is filled with examples. It has been found, for instance, by the historian Hans Delbrueck that "if the Greek claims regarding the strength of the Persians at Thermopylae were true, there would not even have been room for the Persians to occupy the battlefield," and, given the roads of the time, the last Persian troops would have just crossed the Bosphorus when the first had already arrived in Greece. Well, it may be said, these were Greek statistics. But our Census Bureau, which in the 1950 Census recorded a surprising number of widowed

14-year-old boys, does not do much better; and our Agriculture Department in estimating our own, not Soviet, crops, has been known to wander between 450 million and 380 million bushels, a margin even Mr. Estes might find exciting.

My faith remains. The CIA is doing a splendid job. Besides, they mean well. One of the characters in Aldous Huxley's "Point Counter Point" observes: "If you look up 'Intelligence' in the new volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, you'll find it classified under the following three heads: Intelligence, Human; Intelligence, Animal; Intelligence, Military. My stepfather's a perfect specimen of Intelligence, Military." So is the CIA. I am proud of them.

A final point. In the period of self-examination and self-reproach which followed after the assassination of President Kennedy, it was widely said that all of us, and not only the assassin, were in some measure responsible for the tragedy. The hatreds we felt, the hatreds we tolerated had created the climate conducive to this evil deed. But the period of contrition was brief and certainly not sufficiently prolonged for penance. Within a week or so we were reassured. Sundry journalists and pundits imparted to us 'the joyous tidings that our image abroad is unimpaired, that the essential "goodness" of America (as one distinguished columnist described it) is universally recognized, and that our belovedness rating is now at a historic high. I am not surprised. We are loved because we deserve to be loved. No bureau or department of our Government has more strengthened that image, more deepened that affection, more promoted the good will of the community of man than the CIA. Augurs, diviners, college of reason, protectors of peace and understanding, hail!

JAMES R. NEWMAN.
Chevy Chase, Md.

TAB

THE WASHINGTON POST

19 January 1964

Outmoded CIA

Only one comment need be made about your Jan. 1 editorial "How Idiotic." That is former President Truman's comment, "I established the CIA for a purpose and now I think it ought to be disbanded."

The fact is the CIA is giving this country a bad name abroad, rightly or wrongly. Too many people in Latin America and Asia are now afraid not of the United

States Government but of the CIA. What they used to think of the Checka and the Gestapo they now are thinking of the CIA. Few people, of course, have the facts for a judgment on the matter, but in international affairs a bad name is as bad as a bad action. I do not believe the United States can continue to afford this sort of suspicion, true or false. I believe President Truman is right. Let us wind up the CIA.

JOSEPH I. PUENTE

Washington.

TAB

Congress Urged To Oversee CIA

By the Associated Press

Senator Stephen M. Young, Democrat of Ohio, has criticized "the unbridled and unchecked actions" of the Central Intelligence Agency as he urged establishment of a special congressional committee to supervise top-level super-secret Government activity.

The Senator told the Senate yesterday that the CIA has been meddling and interfering in national policies and "acting as a law unto itself."

Senator Young said he joined Senators McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, and Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, in urging that a select congressional committee, patterned after the Joint Congressional Atomic Committee, be established to watch the CIA.

TAB

Gibbons Seeks Group To Watchdog the CIA

We're pleased to learn this district's congressman, Rep Sam Gibbons, is stepping up efforts to obtain passage of legislation to establish a 14-member congressional "watchdog committee" over the Central Intelligence Agency and other U. S. intelligence activities.

Representative Gibbons introduced a resolution to that effect in the first session of the 88th Congress. It did not reach the House floor for debate and vote. He has now urged House Rules Committee members to expedite its passage "for the good of the national interest."

Certainly, the proposal is in the national interest and, in our judgment, merits prompt approval.

The Central Intelligence Agency is perhaps the hushiest of the hush-hush operations into which the cold war has pushed the U.S. government. On the information which the CIA develops by a variety of methods, much of the conduct of our policy rests.

Security in these operations is more important, to be sure. Yet these operations are financed by Congress. And Congress, which is to say the public, has in our constitutional system a right to know at least in large outline what the executive branch does with the money Congress provides.

An institution like the CIA should be solely a body to gather intelligence, to weigh it, interpret it if required, but not to make policy decisions. It was never intended to make policy, which in the field of foreign affairs is the prerogative of the President working through the State Department.

But as Representative Gibbons points out, and correctly so, the agency "has taken on the appearance of a policy-making arm of our government, has frustrated other government operations, and has, in some areas, placed our foreign policy objectives in jeopardy."

We urge him to keep pushing for passage of his measure. There is every reason to believe a joint watchdog committee could serve a highly proper and most useful function without violating security, in much the same way the Atomic Energy has done in an equally secret field for years.

TAB

JAN 9 1964

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

CIA Trespass Feared at State

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Star Staff Writer

There is unhappiness in the State Department over a decision by the White House permitting the Central Intelligence Agency to publicize a recent analysis of the Soviet economy.

Some department officials fear that the CIA is infringing on their role as the shaper of American foreign policy. They say the CIA should stick to intelligence gathering.

Agency's Viewpoint

The CIA in this case believes it is only performing a necessary function in informing the world about the sorry state of Russia's economy, and by supporting the administration's policy against long-range credits which might ball the Kremlin out.

No State Department official would comment publicly on this matter, but it is known that the CIA, with President Johnson's approval, has been providing journalists with up-to-date briefings on the Soviet economy.

To give these briefings an authoritative air, the usually hush-hush CIA has allowed its name to be used as the source of the stories.

These briefings have stressed the declining rate of Russia's growth and the relatively small total of Russia's gold holdings.

The analysis has called for an embargo on long-term credits to the Soviet Union since such credits would allow the Kremlin to accelerate its economy at minimal cost.

State Department officials agree with these estimates—which clash radically with official Soviet figures—and even assert that department intelligence had arrived at the same conclusions before the CIA did.

But the officials argue that the CIA's function is not to release information to the press. And they are angry at the CIA's effort to take a leading role in persuading the public against granting long-term credits to Russia.

The question of credits, they say, is a sensitive one, involving extensive discussions with United States allies. The department is on record against credits of more than five years, but some officials are not convinced that all trade and all credits are necessarily bad.

Premier Wants Credit

Soviet Premier Khrushchev has shown an interest in purchasing fertilizer plants on credit to improve his nation's agriculture. Some top-ranking officials believe that a well fed Soviet population might in the long run be to this country's interest.

Its critics agree the CIA, with its large corps of professional economists, is well equipped to analyze Russia's economy. But they assert that such briefings involve the CIA in policy functions that properly belong to the State Department.

Released in December

It was learned that the CIA began releasing the substance of the analysis in late December after CIA Director John A. McCone received permission from President Johnson. The report appeared in an article by Charles Bartlett in the December 29 Star.

Mr. McCone was reported to believe that it was necessary for the American public to know the full extent of the sad state of the Russian economy—and how credits might boost the regiment at no gain to the West.

There had been reports immediately following Premier Khrushchev's December 9 speech that the Soviet Union would be emphasizing the consumer goods industry and might be seeking increased trade with the West. The CIA analysis, backed by the State Department's experts, sees Russia's priority of defense and industry unchanged, with consumer goods still lagging behind.

TAB

JAN 10 1964

WASHINGTON STAR

SHORT-TERM POLICY?

CIA Seeks Better Image

The Central Intelligence Agency, long reluctant to even publish its phone number, has launched a small-scale public relations campaign to improve its press "image."

There are signs, however, that opposition from the State Department and other Government agencies may lead to a White House order stopping the campaign, almost as soon as it is started.

During the last three weeks, the CIA has been giving briefings to reporters on the current state of the Soviet economy.

Actually, this is an old CIA practice. The new element was that the CIA allowed the reporters to name the CIA as the source for the stories.

Yesterday, the agency invited about 20 reporters to a briefing on Russia's economy at the CIA's new Virginia headquarters. Fourteen reporters showed up.

Normal security regulations were followed. The newsmen were asked to sign their names upon entering the main entrance of the headquarters, and were given identification tags.

A CIA escort made sure the newsmen did not wander on the way to the briefing room—the same room where the super-secret United States In-

Red Economy at Crossroads.

Page A-5

telligence Board holds its weekly meetings.

A CIA spokesman, who said his identity must remain a secret to the public, said the agency, headed by John A. McCone, had asked and received President Johnson's permission to declassify the Soviet economic estimate and release it to the press.

The spokesman noted that more than half of the CIA's employees are engaged in "overt" work—that is, analysis of data received in the headquarters. Most of the data is from published sources. The other employees in the "covert" sector are engaged in espionage or other secret activities.

It has been the work of these "covert" workers in the Bay of Pigs and the South Viet Nam political maneuvering that has led to a public—and press—image of the CIA which is not particularly complimentary.

The briefing was designed to show that the CIA's corps of economic specialists does a job that reflected well on the CIA. The spokesman said that the briefings were an experiment, and that the CIA was

considering holding other briefings on a sporadic basis.

The State Department and other agencies object to the CIA's taking a role in dissemination and shaping of news dealing with foreign policy. It is expected that a protest will be levied with the White House on the matter.

Traditionally, the CIA's job has been to supply and analyze intelligence information for the exclusive use of the President and other agencies.

The briefings, themselves, have been conducted by a group of economists whose names the press was asked not to reveal.

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JAN 10 1964

Approved For Release 2002/08/15 : CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210004-1

C.I.A. DROPS CLOAK AND MEETS PRESS

Experts Brief 20 Reporters
on Lag in Soviet Growth
and Decline in Gold

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 — The Central Intelligence Agency held a news conference today. The subject was the state of the Soviet economy, but the C.I.A. findings about that had already been leaked to the press.

The event today was news because the agency, which only a few years ago was reluctant to list its telephone numbers, has decided to show as much of itself as possible to the public and the Congress.

Long bothered by the widespread criticism of some of its failures and never able to boast of its cloak-and-dagger triumphs, the agency has found something to advertise — its analytical brains. In Mr. Johnson it has found a President who does not mind.

State Department Chagrined

The State Department minds a great deal. Its officials were chagrined by the C.I.A.'s distribution of intelligence estimates and by the news conference, partly because they themselves wish to control the flow of information affecting foreign relations, partly because they question the wisdom of the C.I.A.'s becoming publicly committed to intelligence findings.

But a spokesman of the agency, describing the news conference as an experiment, said "Why not?" Every once in a while, he said, the agency comes by a significant story that, though gathered partly by clandestine means, need not be hidden in secret drawers. Applying the rule of reason, he said, there seemed nothing wrong with publicizing the material for attribution to the agency.

The spokesman said the intelligence analysts lived in "one side of the house" that could and ought to be talked about. The other side of the C.I.A.'s \$46-million headquarters eight miles from Washington, in McLean, Va., is the one that manages the nation's most secret operations around the world, including espionage.

About 20 newsmen were invited to the massive but unmarked headquarters this afternoon and shown to the Central Intelligence board conference room.

They were introduced to leading analysts of Soviet affairs, but were asked not to use the analysts' names in transmitting the agency's startling conclusions.

Sharp Decline Reported

These were that the once impressive 6 per cent annual economic growth rate of the Soviet Union had slipped to 2.5 per cent in the last two years, that Soviet gold reserves had fallen to \$2 billion, that Moscow would have to borrow heavily in the West to finance industrial expansion and that the Soviet Union was falling behind rather than catching up with the United States.

Disturbed though they were by the C.I.A.'s distribution of this material, officials at the State Department and elsewhere in the Government do not dispute the findings.

They said Soviet experts at universities and in other countries who have challenged the agency's conclusions "are simply behind the times."

Study Was Requested

In fact, the study disclosed by the C.I.A. was said to have been requested some time ago by the State Department for a public education program. The department wished to erase the worldwide image of constant economic progress by the Soviet system and to strengthen its argument that the extension of long-term credits to Moscow, by Western nations could help Premier Khrushchev through a serious economic crisis without forcing him to divert resources from military budgets.

Under Secretary of State George W. Ball used most of the same material for a speech in New York this evening.

The C.I.A.'s wish to claim the credit for the analysis may be another reason for its first venture into open publicity.

The Administration hopes to persuade the Western allies to extend only short-term credits to the Russians so that they will be forced to choose between a diversion of funds from military projects and continued low-growth rates. Its current tactic is to make this decision easier for Moscow by stressing Washington's interest in matching military budget cuts and thus limiting the arms race.

Soviet Arms Cut Urged

President Johnson called on Premier Khrushchev yesterday to follow his example in curtailing the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. Mr. Khrushchev himself has shown some interest in a "policy of mutual example"—that is, arms control without formal agreement.

The discussion of the significance of the latest analyses of the Soviet economy was overshadowed here this evening, however, by puzzlement over the methods of making them public. The C.I.A. obtained approval for its news conference from President Johnson because, it said, he shared the agency's belief that the true picture of the Soviet economy was fundamental to the foreign policies of this country and other non-Communist nations.

The C.I.A. estimated that Premier Khrushchev's program to expand Soviet chemical industries would force him to import machinery and equipment from the West at a cost of several hundred million dollars a year—possibly as much as \$2 billion for the seven-year program.

Credits Believed Vital

Because of the dwindling Soviet gold reserves, the agency's analysts said, the Russians are almost certain to require long-term credits. The United States argument to its allies has been that the extension of such credits would give the Russians a relatively easy way to support budgets for both guns and butter.

The high costs of defense and space programs plus the serious failure of Soviet agriculture account for the Soviet slump, the C.I.A. said. On a per capita basis, the analysts calculated that agricultural production in 1963 was 10 per cent below that of 1958. Total farm output declined 4 per cent in 1962 and probably more than 4 per cent last year, they said.

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Continued

telligence information is not entirely without precedent. The agency's former director, Allen W. Dulles, made occasional speeches about his staff's findings, including several about the success in past years of the Soviet economy. Presumably, his use of the material was coordinated with his brother, the late John Foster Dulles, who was then Secretary of State.

The agency also has been willing from time to time to brief individual correspondents. Its analysts, often drawn from the nation's campuses, have spoken as freely as their counterparts in the State and Defense Departments, but they never permitted the information to be labeled as the findings of the C.I.A.

In recent months, the agency's director, John A. McCone, and his aides have complained about the poor press notices of the C.I.A. The emphasis, they noted, seemed always to be on notable failures, such as the loss of a U-2 in the Soviet Union in 1960, the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba in 1961 and, to some extent, embarrassing policy disputes in South Vietnam last year.

British Divided on Issue

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Jan. 9 — British experts on Soviet affairs were inclined today to look upon the Central Intelligence Agency's estimate of a sharp decline in the Soviet economic growth rate as "just another document" that must be evaluated with the rest.

"One must consider the source," said the head of research of one of Britain's biggest banks. "I would say their estimates are on the low side."

A bullion concern challenged the C.I.A.'s estimate that Soviet gold reserves had fallen below \$2 billion and that gold output in the Soviet Union was \$150 million annually.

A partner in the bullion concern asked:

"If production is so low, where did all the gold come from for postwar sales to the West? Were the Russians supposed to have increased their reserves by so much during the war?"

"No one really knows anything," another authority said. "It's all a big guessing game."

One bank's experts thought the Central Intelligence Agency had done a "very good job." But they expressed the opinion that the C.I.A.'s estimate of Soviet economic growth and gross national product were a little on the high side.

There was no official British reaction to the report, which was summarized today in several London newspapers and in international editions of New York newspapers.

The Guardian's Soviet affairs expert saw the C.I.A.'s information as eliminating an "eco-

nomie-growth gap" in much the same way that the "missile gap" was eliminated several years ago.

In the "missile gap," the United States thought the Soviet Union was ahead in missile production. Later information led to a reversed picture: that the United States was leading. Now, according to The Guardian's analyst, estimates of Soviet economic growth have been reversed to show that the United States growth rate is greater than that of the Soviet Union.

Studies on the Soviet Union are not so extensive or exhaustive in Britain as in the United States, but they do comprise, as in the United States, a wide diversity of opinion.

A top-level group of businessmen who visited the Soviet Union for 11 days last May to evaluate trade prospects, returned to Britain with the conclusion that the Soviet economy and standard of living were "developing rapidly."

In October, another delegation of British businessmen toured the Soviet Union. They reported that they had been "impressed by the tremendous effort which is being put into research and development."

However, specialists here had noted a slowdown in Soviet economic growth.

Apart from the Soviet Union agricultural troubles, the experts cite a lag in cellulose production, a shortage of abrasive materials for engineering and other industries, a failure to reach production goals for sulphuric acid and, most important, a general crisis in the chemical industry.

All of these factors, the experts say, add up to something less than "rapid development."

Nevertheless, the view of experts here was that, although the Soviet growth rate was lagging, it was still ahead of that of the United States. Now this proposition must be restudied.

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WASHINGTON POST

10 January 1964

Soviet Economic Growth Down Sharply, CIA Says

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld
Staff Reporter

The Administration moved on two fronts yesterday to deflate Soviet claims of superior economic growth.

The Central Intelligence Agency broke a long standing policy of official silence to hold a press conference at its Virginia headquarters for all interested American reporters.

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, followed with an evening speech to the National Retail Merchants Association in New York.

Both said the Soviet rate of growth fell from 6 per cent and higher to less than 2.5 per cent in 1962 and 1963. The comparative American figures, said the CIA, were 6 per cent in 1962 and an estimated 3.7 per cent in 1963.

Lead Increasing

The debunking purpose of CIA's unusual public report was apparent in a press release. It referred to Moscow's "boasts of overtaking and surpassing U.S. production by

1970" and it said its review "supports just the opposite conclusion—namely, that the Soviet Union is falling behind in the economic race."

Ball said that "in the past 12 years, the excess of our gross product over that of Soviet Russia has risen from \$245 billion to \$290 billion."

He went on: "Even if the U.S.S.R. were to double its output in the next decade—which it cannot do—its production in 1972 would still be less than ours in 1962."

The CIA included in its analysis an implicit plea for support of the Administration's policy against granting long term credits to the Soviets. It suggested that such credits would allow Russia to break out of the economic predicament in which the CIA believes it is caught.

Material Leaked

This pitch has disturbed some State Department officials on grounds that the CIA should stick to collecting intelligence, not promoting policies. But Under Secretary

Ball did not mention credits in his New York speech.

The material which the CIA presented, and which Ball drew from, has been available in Government circles for a number of months. Some of it surfaced obliquely in a speech by Walt W. Rostow, the State Department's top policy planner, last fall and all of it was leaked to several reporters earlier this week.

According to one version, the CIA material was released at the behest of CIA Director John A. McCone and with the approval of President Johnson.

The CIA's briefer said yesterday that "practically all" of its material was "from the expertise of analysts, rather than secret or clandestine information." Asked about the surprise with which some private economists greeted its low estimates, the briefer said the CIA has "more information" and the "best techniques" of analysis and that "only we" make current estimates of the Soviet gross product.

Agriculture Vital

Agriculture failures were identified as the "single most important factor" cutting the over-all Soviet growth rate in 1962 and 1963. With better farm weather, Moscow "may be able to recover somewhat," said the CIA.

But, the agency said, industrial growth rates in those years slowed from 9 to 7 per cent and in the key forward-looking category of capital investment, the drop was from 12-15 per cent to 4.5 per cent.

Hence the prospects for regaining and sustaining the high growth rates of the 1950s are "not very bright," the CIA said.

The CIA presented the Kremlin's problem as one of how to find resources for its various needs. After taking some investment funds from growth and from low priority civilian sectors, it said, Russia faces a gold shortage which means that "increased credits represent the only promising means" to finance the necessary machinery imports.

Called Ideological

Hence the CIA feels that a western cramp on credits will remove the Soviet Union's easy way out of its bind. The agency's briefer said the Russians may consider imports of chemical goods (particularly for the farms) so urgent that if credits are not attractive they might even siphon funds away from defense. He hastened to add that there are no signs of this so far.

In New York, Ball had a different slant on the Soviet squeeze. He agreed with the CIA that Russia is now at the point where it has largely exhausted the short cuts of imported technology and inherited capital.

But, ignoring the question of resource allocation, he said the Soviet dilemma was ideological: "Can a complex modern economy be effectively operated under the restraining hand of Communist doctrine?"

The Soviets have to choose between moving toward some kind of market economy or imposing more elaborate controls, Ball said. The CIA analysis ignored this question.

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NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

13 January 1964

The CIA's Open Door

N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE 1-13-64 (22)
The new Central Intelligence Agency policy seems to be one of open secrets, openly delivered.

No doubt surplus information piles up in the CIA even faster than surplus wheat in Mr. Freeman's granaries. But the device chosen by the CIA for disposing of it sets a disturbing precedent.

We're not, obviously, against press conferences, or against disclosure of what the government's up to—in most cases. But the CIA is quintessentially a special case. Its business is secrecy; its operations are necessarily beyond public view, as are its sources of information and its means of evaluation.

It so happens that the CIA has had a good many collisions lately with both State and Defense; it also so happens that CIA has been getting a bad press on a lot of its recent

doings. If CIA is resentful at having to take brickbats for its failures without being able to publicize its successes, that's a human enough reaction. But the secret agent's role is seldom a hero's, and public acclamation is not the measure of CIA virtue. Nor is public education—at least in so direct a way—the CIA function.

If it were, the CIA could become a dangerous instrument of internal propaganda.

There are ample existing means for getting CIA findings to the public, without seeming to set the agency up as a competitor with State, Defense or any other department for the public's ear. Such competition could only compromise the agency's essential tasks, including its role as an impartial and expert gatherer and evaluator of facts—for use by the appropriate government agencies.

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The Washington Post
17 January 1964
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"Pst! Want To See Some Hot Statistics?"



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